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ABSTRACT 
  The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 (the Act) makes it a crime to lie 
about having received a medal authorized by Congress for the 
military. In 2010, in United States v. Alvarez, the Ninth Circuit found 
the Act unconstitutional under the First Amendment, holding that 
false statements of fact, like other content-based restrictions on 
speech, are subject to strict scrutiny. The Act failed this test because, 
according to the court, it was not narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling government interest. The decision highlights the 
uncertainty of First Amendment protections for false speech. Though 
the Supreme Court has held that certain categories of false speech—
such as fraud and defamation—are proscribable, it has not ruled 
directly on a case in which false speech had been barred without 
respect to context, intent, or harm. This Note argues that false speech 
should be presumptively protected by the First Amendment, with 
exceptions for certain classes of speech that result in concrete harm to 
individuals. Such protection would limit government control of 
speech, avoid chilling worthy speech, promote privacy and autonomy, 
and result in easier administration for courts. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the summer of 2007, Xavier Alvarez stood before a meeting of 
the Three Valleys Municipal Water Board to introduce himself.1 He 
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told those in attendance: “I’m a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in 
the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal 
of Honor. I got wounded many times by the same guy. I’m still 
around.”2 The summer before he was elected to the district’s water 
board, Alvarez told people he had been awarded the Medal of Honor 
for rescuing the American ambassador during the Iranian hostage 
crisis.3 
At about the same time that Alvarez was introducing himself as a 
decorated war hero, a man who went by the name Rick Duncan was 
telling people in Colorado that he had received the Purple Heart 
during his service as a Marine.4 Duncan said that he was an Annapolis 
graduate who had survived the September 11 attack on the Pentagon 
and three tours of duty in Iraq.5 He had become known in Colorado 
through his antiwar politicking in the run-up to the 2008 election and 
had earned respect for his work on behalf of homeless veterans in 
Colorado Springs.6 
Alvarez and Duncan appeared to be dedicated Americans, men 
who had served their country honorably in the armed forces and had 
continued on as public servants once their tours were complete. But 
Alvarez and Duncan were not as they appeared. Alvarez had never 
been a Marine, and he had never received the Medal of Honor.7 Rick 
Duncan was not even the Colorado man’s real name; he was actually 
Rick Glen Strandlof, a high school dropout and small-time criminal 
who had never served in the armed forces.8 
When Alvarez and Strandlof were exposed as liars, they faced 
more than scorn and public humiliation. Each was charged with 
violating the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 (the Act).9 The statute makes 
it a crime for an individual to “falsely represent[] himself or herself, 
verbally or in writing, to have been awarded any decoration or medal 
authorized by Congress for the Armed Forces of the United States.”10 
 1. United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 1201. 
 4. Kevin Simpson, Many Faces of ‘Fake Vet’ Rick Strandlof Exposed, DENVER POST, June 
7, 2009, at A1. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1200–01. 
 8. Simpson, supra note 4. 
 9. Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2006). 
 10. Id. 
WOOD IN PRINTER PROOF 10/13/2011  9:53:18 AM 
2011] TRUTH, LIES, AND STOLEN VALOR 471 
 
On July 16, 2010, the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado 
dismissed the charges against Strandlof on First Amendment 
grounds.11 Alvarez, however, pled guilty to the charges against him 
but appealed the First Amendment issue to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.12 On August 17, 2010, a three-judge 
panel ruled 2–1 that the Stolen Valor Act was unconstitutional 
because “regulations of false factual speech must, like other content-
based speech restrictions, be subjected to strict scrutiny unless the 
statute is narrowly crafted to target the type of false factual speech 
previously held proscribable because it is not protected by the First 
Amendment.”13 Judge Jay Bybee dissented, arguing that his 
colleagues had misconstrued the Supreme Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence to find protection for false statements of fact that did 
not exist.14 He wrote, “False statements are unprotected by the First 
Amendment except in a limited set of contexts where such protection 
is necessary ‘to protect speech that matters.’”15 In March, the Ninth 
Circuit denied the government’s request to rehear United States v. 
Alvarez16 en banc.17 The government filed a petition for a writ of 
certiorari with the Supreme Court on August 18, 2011.18 Prosecutors 
in Strandlof’s case appealed to the Tenth Circuit, which heard oral 
argument in May 2011.19 
The debate over the constitutionality of the Stolen Valor Act 
highlights a fundamental disagreement over the scope of protection 
for false statements of fact under the First Amendment. Though the 
Supreme Court announced in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.20 that “there 
is no constitutional value in false statements of fact,”21 it has never 
evaluated the constitutionality of a statute such as the Stolen Valor 
 11. United States v. Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1192 (D. Colo. 2010). 
 12. Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1201. 
 13. Id. at 1200. The majority opinion was written by Judge Milan Smith, Jr. and joined by 
Judge Thomas Nelson. Id. at 1199. 
 14. Id. at 1219 (Bybee, J., dissenting). 
 15. Id. at 1218–19 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974)). 
 16. United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 17. United States v. Alvarez, 638 F.3d 666, 666 (9th Cir. 2011) (order denying the 
government’s petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc). 
 18. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, United States v. Alvarez, No. 11-210 (U.S. Aug. 18, 
2011). 
 19. John Ingold, Free Speech Versus Vets’ Valor Argued, DENVER POST, May 13, 2011, at 
B1. 
 20. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
 21. Id. at 340. 
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Act, which punishes false speech without regard to context, intent, or 
harm.22 Moreover, it has never adequately explained the reasoning 
behind its blanket statement that false statements of fact have no 
constitutional value.23 At the heart of the disagreement over the 
Stolen Valor Act is a question of framing: Does the First Amendment 
presumptively protect all speech without regard to truth or falsity, 
with exceptions for certain types of false speech such as defamation, 
false light, and fraud?24 Or is false speech presumptively unprotected, 
subject to spheres of protection for certain classes of speech—such as 
defamatory statements about public officials that are made without 
actual malice—that must be protected to avoid chilling other worthy 
speech?25 
This Note argues that First Amendment protection should 
extend to speech without regard to truth or falsity, subject to 
exceptions for the already well-defined classes of false speech—
defamation and fraud—that create concrete, individualized harm. 
This protection would promote the goals of the First Amendment by 
limiting government control of speech, and it would avoid the 
difficulties inherent in sorting truth from fiction, resulting in greater 
ease of administration for courts.26 The Stolen Valor Act seeks to 
regulate speech based on its content, and the speech it seeks to 
regulate does not fall into any of the standard categorical exceptions. 
Thus, the Act should be subject to strict scrutiny.27 It fails the rigorous 
requirements of strict scrutiny because it does not advance a 
compelling governmental interest and is not narrowly tailored.28 
 22. See infra Part I.A.2. 
 23. See infra Part I.A.2. 
 24. See Eugene Volokh, Restricting Recklessly/Knowingly False Statements About Political 
Candidates, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 5, 2007, 3:33 PM), http://volokh.com/2007/10/05/
restricting-recklesslyknowingly-false-statements-about-political-candidates (framing the issue in 
the context of the Washington Supreme Court’s decision in Rickert v. State Public Disclosure 
Commission, 168 P.3d 826 (Wash. 2007)); see also Mark Tushnet, ‘Telling Me Lies’: The 
Constitutionality of Regulating False Statements of Fact 15 (Harvard Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal 
Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 11-02, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1737930 (framing the argument as a “level of generality” problem). 
 25. United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1220–21 (9th Cir. 2010) (Bybee, J., dissenting) 
(“Thus, the general rule is that false statements of fact are not protected by the First 
Amendment. There is, however, an important exception to this principle: where protecting a 
false statement is necessary ‘in order to protect speech that matters.’” (footnote omitted) 
(quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341)). 
 26. See infra Parts II, III.C. 
 27. See infra Part III.B. 
 28. See infra Part III.B. 
WOOD IN PRINTER PROOF 10/13/2011  9:53:18 AM 
2011] TRUTH, LIES, AND STOLEN VALOR 473 
 
Though the impulse to protect the integrity of military honors is 
noble, such protection does not serve a compelling interest. People 
frequently lie about military service and honors,29 and it is hard to 
imagine that those lies significantly affect the ability of the military to 
recruit and carry on its mission effectively. Even if the protection of 
medals were a compelling interest, the Act would fail the prong 
requiring that the law be narrowly tailored because it punishes pure 
speech without regard to context or harm.30 The Ninth Circuit 
majority and the district court judge in Colorado, therefore, were 
correct in striking down the law as unconstitutional. 
This Note proceeds in three Parts. Part I examines the case law 
and legal theory on false statements of fact under the First 
Amendment, arguing that the jurisprudence lacks clarity as to 
whether false statements of fact like those made by Alvarez and 
Strandlof are protected. Part II discusses reasons for protecting false 
statements of fact, including limiting government control over the 
content of speech, promoting the privacy and autonomy of 
individuals, allowing for easy administration, and avoiding the chilling 
of protected speech. Part III applies the analytical framework of Parts 
I and II to the Stolen Valor Act, concluding that the Ninth Circuit 
and the federal district court in Colorado were correct to declare the 
Act unconstitutional. Even if the Act is constitutional under relevant 
case law, the Supreme Court should clarify this muddled area and 
move away from its blanket statement that false statements of fact 
have no constitutional value. 
I.  FALSE SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
A. The Supreme Court’s Approach to Freedom of Expression and 
False Speech 
The text of the First Amendment’s protection of expression is 
deceptively plain: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech . . . .”31 Though the language appears to provide 
 29. For instance, then-Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal frequently 
misrepresented himself as having served in the Vietnam War. See Raymond Hernandez, 
Candidate’s Words Differ from His History, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2010, at A1. The falsity of his 
statements garnered much media attention during his 2010 run for the U.S. Senate, which was 
ultimately successful despite the unflattering publicity. Id. 
 30. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 31. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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absolute immunity against government restrictions on all kinds of 
speech, the Free Speech Clause has not been interpreted as providing 
such unlimited protection.32 As Justice Holmes wrote in 1919, “[T]he 
First Amendment . . . cannot have been, and obviously was not, 
intended to give immunity for every possible use of language.”33 Such 
an extreme vision of the First Amendment would foreclose 
restrictions on expression that have been accepted as essential to the 
orderly functioning of society, such as prohibitions against perjury 
and the solicitation of murder.34 The Court has instead created a 
complex web of categorical exceptions to the general rule that speech 
is constitutionally protected.35 
1. First Amendment Theory and Case Law.  Because of the broad 
language of the First Amendment, scholars and courts have struggled 
to develop a coherent theory of First Amendment protection for the 
freedom of expression.36 In the absence of clear evidence of the 
Framers’ intent,37 scholars and judges have crafted their own theories 
 32. See John Paul Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE L.J. 1293, 1295–96 (1993) 
(arguing that although “[t]he plain language of the First Amendment indicates that the Framers 
intended to establish a rule of absolute immunity,” the inclusion of the article “the” indicates 
that “the draftsmen intended to immunize a previously identified category or subset of 
speech”). See generally FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 
89 (1982) (discussing the meaning of “speech” and noting that “[r]ights of course are not 
unlimited in scope” and that a right to free speech does not include “a ‘right’ to commit perjury, 
or to extort, or to threaten bodily harm, although all of these are speech acts”). 
 33. Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919). 
 34. See id. (“We venture to believe that neither Hamilton nor Madison, nor any competent 
person then or later, ever supposed that to make criminal the counselling of a murder within the 
jurisdiction of Congress would be an unconstitutional interference with free speech.”); DAVID 
L. LANGE & H. JEFFERSON POWELL, NO LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE IMAGE OF 
AN ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT 411 n.1 (2008) (“[D]eception and perjury . . . [have never] 
been seen as falling within the protection of the First Amendment under any serious theoretical 
approach to the subject . . . .”). 
 35. Stephen G. Gey, The First Amendment and the Dissemination of Socially Worthless 
Untruths, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2008) (“In the modern era, the basic First Amendment 
rule is that speech is constitutionally protected in the absence of proof that the speech creates a 
much more individualized and concrete harm than simple offense.”). 
 36. See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 
YALE L.J. 877, 877 (1963) (discussing the failure of theorists to develop an “adequate or 
comprehensive theory of the first amendment” and noting that “[t]he Supreme Court did not 
seriously commence the task of interpretation until [United States v. Schenck, 249 U.S. 47 
(1919)]”). 
 37. See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY (1960) (noting that the freedom of expression had 
almost no history as a concept prior to the First Amendment, and thus no reasoned analysis 
existed of what it meant, how far it extended, and under what circumstances it might be 
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to guide their inquiries into what types of speech the First 
Amendment was designed to protect. The four leading theories are: 
the marketplace-of-ideas theory, the self-governance theory, the 
individual-self-fulfillment theory, and the safety-valve theory.38 
The marketplace-of-ideas theory is premised on the belief that 
freedom of expression is “the best process for advancing knowledge 
and discovering truth.”39 It assumes that the best judgment comes 
from considering all the facts before arriving at a decision.40 Under 
this theory, the exchange of knowledge should not be restricted 
because suppressing discussion perpetuates errors and blocks the 
generation of new ideas.41 Justice Holmes articulated the 
marketplace-of-ideas theory in his dissent in Abrams v. United 
States42: “[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade 
in ideas[,] . . . the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get 
itself accepted in the competition of the market, and . . . truth is the 
only ground upon which [men’s] wishes safely can be carried out.”43 
Another influential theory of protection for speech, the self-
governance theory, provides a more narrow conception of freedom of 
speech than does the marketplace-of-ideas theory. It holds that 
speech should be protected because it allows speakers to engage in 
decisionmaking “through a process of open discussion which is 
available to all members of the community.”44 The self-governance 
theory becomes problematic when taken to its extreme, however: if 
self-governance is the sole or most important reason for protecting 
limited); RODNEY A. SMOLLA, 1 SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 1:1–:2, :7, 
:11 (2010) (“There is . . . precious little record of what freedom of speech and of the press really 
meant to the framers.”). 
 38. See Emerson, supra note 36, at 878–86 (discussing the four theories and labeling the 
safety-valve theory the “balance between stability and change”); Gey, supra note 35, at 6–14 
(labeling the four theories the marketplace of ideas, the facilitation of democracy, the safety 
valve, and the protection of individual liberty and autonomy). 
 39. Emerson, supra note 36, at 881. 
 40. Id. Like all the leading theories of First Amendment protection for free speech, the 
marketplace-of-ideas theory has limits. It is understood to be based on the assumptions that 
there is an objective truth to be discovered and that an open marketplace will lead to the 
discovery of that truth. 1 SMOLLA, supra note 37, § 2:18–:19. But because “the modern mind is 
likely to be suspicious that truth in any absolute sense is within human capability, . . . . [t]he 
marketplace theory is thus best understood not as a guarantor of the final conquest of truth, but 
rather as a defense of the process of an open marketplace.” Id. 
 41. 1 SMOLLA, supra note 37, § 2:18–:19. 
 42. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
 43. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 44. Emerson, supra note 36, at 882. 
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speech, it follows that only speech related to politics or self-
governance should be protected.45 A wide range of speech, notably 
nonpolitical artistic and literary expression, could be excluded from 
protection under this view.46 
The individual-self-fulfillment theory grounds freedom of 
expression in the “widely accepted premise of Western thought that 
the proper end of man is the realization of his character and 
potentialities as a human being.”47 Theorists differ in their emphases 
on the importance of self-actualization. Some formulate a theory of 
self-fulfillment that emphasizes free speech as an end in itself. This 
theory of free speech was expounded by Justice Marshall in Procunier 
v. Martinez48: “The First Amendment serves not only the needs of the 
polity but also those of the human spirit—a spirit that demands self-
expression.”49 Under this theory, it is expression itself—regardless of 
its truth or falsity—that is the good to be protected. Other theorists 
emphasize self-fulfillment as a quest for truth—a kind of smaller-scale 
marketplace-of-ideas theory.50 Professor Thomas Emerson, for 
 45. 1 SMOLLA, supra note 37, § 2:6; see also ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH 
AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 93–94 (1948) (arguing that the freedom of speech is 
derived from the necessities of self-government); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some 
First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20 (1971) (“Constitutional protection should be 
accorded only to speech that is explictily [sic] political. There is no basis for judicial intervention 
to protect any other form of expression, be it scientific, literary or that variety of expression we 
call obscene or pornographic.”). Despite its rejection of this narrow conception of protected 
speech, the Court still affords political speech the utmost protection, stating that “[t]he First 
Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political expression in order ‘to assure [the] 
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by 
the people.’” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 13 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting Roth v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)). 
 46. See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Book Review, 62 HARV. L. REV. 891, 899–900 (1949) 
(reviewing MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 45) (pointing out the weakness in Meiklejohn’s distinction 
between public and private speech and noting that “[an individual] can get help from poems and 
plays and novels,” even “if Shakespeare and Whitehead do seem very far away from the issues 
of the next election”). 
 47. Emerson, supra note 36, at 879. But see Bork, supra note 45, at 25 (criticizing this view 
on the basis that the self-fulfillment theory does not provide a neutral ground for protecting 
speech). 
 48. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974). 
 49. Id. at 427; see also Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503–04 
(1984) (“The First Amendment presupposes that the freedom to speak one’s mind is . . . an 
aspect of individual liberty—and thus a good unto itself . . . .”). 
 50. Emerson, supra note 36, at 880. Professor Robert Bork, for example, divides the self-
fulfillment goals of free speech into two separate categories: the development of the faculties of 
the individual and the happiness to be derived from engaging in the activity. Bork, supra note 
45, at 25. 
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example, describes such a theory, noting that “[t]o cut off [man’s] 
search for truth, or his expression of it, is thus to elevate society and 
the state to a despotic command and to reduce the individual to the 
arbitrary control of others.”51 A self-fulfillment theory that is 
conceptualized as an individual’s quest for betterment through 
knowledge and truth would seem to be less protective of speech 
because speech that does not further this quest would not be 
protected.52 
The safety-valve theory holds that protecting expression is 
important because repressing speech leads to negative 
consequences.53 This theory is not usually one of the leading 
justifications for protecting false statements of fact, but it does have 
some utility. Some scholars argue, for instance, that the United States 
should not punish Holocaust denial because to do so would only 
invigorate anti-Semitic forces.54 Allowing people to express their 
views—however offensive or untrue—avoids the more harmful 
consequences associated with suppressing their speech. 
Although each of the theories of freedom of expression protects 
only certain types of speech, the Supreme Court has resisted adopting 
a conception of speech that conforms to a single theory. Instead, it 
has declared that “[t]he guarantees for speech and press are not the 
preserve of political expression or comment upon public affairs, 
essential as those are to healthy government”55 and has maintained 
that the protections of the First Amendment “are not confined to any 
field of human interest.”56 
 51. Emerson, supra note 36, at 880. 
 52. Although Professor Emerson frames the theory as an individual search for truth, he 
does not limit the theory based on that aim. See id. (“[F]reedom of expression, while not the 
sole or sufficient end of society, is a good in itself . . . .”). 
 53. Gey, supra note 35, at 10 (“The notion [of the safety-valve justification] is that the First 
Amendment allows those who disagree strongly with the political status quo to vent their anger 
and therefore release pressure that could otherwise potentially build into a revolutionary 
conflagration.”). 
 54. See, e.g., Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Where’s the Harm?: Free Speech and the Regulation of 
Lies, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1091, 1101 (2008) (arguing that, even though Holocaust denial 
“poses a real threat of dignitary harm, pollution of public discourse, and even incitement of 
discrimination and violence against Jews” and there is little to fear from government regulation, 
the government should not criminally punish Holocaust denial because “punishment of 
believers will only tend to strengthen their convictions”). 
 55. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967). 
 56. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945). 
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Under this broad conception of protection for speech, content-
based restrictions are generally subject to strict scrutiny, which 
requires the government to show that a restriction is narrowly 
tailored to further a compelling interest.57 Content-based restrictions 
on speech are those that “suppress, disadvantage, or impose 
differential burdens upon speech because of its content.”58 Over the 
years, though, the Court has carved out categories of speech that are 
not subject to this exacting standard. The Court famously articulated 
its approach to categorical exceptions to First Amendment 
protections in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire59: 
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of 
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been 
thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd 
and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 
“fighting” words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury 
or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well 
observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition 
of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any 
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the 
social interest in order and morality.60 
In United States v. Stevens,61 the Court reiterated its reliance on this 
categorical approach, and identified the historical and traditional 
categories that may be restricted as obscenity, defamation, fraud, 
incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct.62 
Moreover, the government may not further restrict speech that 
falls into proscribable categories on the basis of the viewpoint it 
communicates. In order to avoid viewpoint discrimination, which 
targets speech based on the particular position it expresses,63 the 
 57. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“Content-based regulations are 
presumptively invalid.”); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978) 
(“Especially where, as here, a prohibition is directed at speech itself, . . . the State may prevail 
only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling . . . . Even then, the State must 
employ means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement . . . .” (third omission in 
original) (quoting Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 58. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994). 
 59. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
 60. Id. at 571–72 (footnotes omitted). 
 61. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010). 
 62. Id. at 1584. 
 63. 1 SMOLLA, supra note 37, § 3:9; see, e.g., City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wisc. 
Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167, 175–76 (1976) (“To permit one side of a debatable 
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Court has limited permissible content discrimination within 
proscribable categories to discrimination in which “the basis for the 
content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire 
class of speech at issue is proscribable.”64 For example, the state may 
prohibit obscenity that is especially prurient, because the very reason 
obscenity is unprotected is its prurience. In such a case, “no 
significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination exists.”65 It may 
not, however, prohibit only obscenity that contains offensive political 
messages, because political messages both have nothing to do with 
the reason obscenity is proscribable and are protected in their own 
right.66 The prohibition against viewpoint discrimination within 
categories of proscribable speech further illustrates the First 
Amendment’s presumption against allowing the government to favor 
one kind of speech over another. 
The theories of First Amendment protection—marketplace of 
ideas, self-governance, individual self-fulfillment, and safety valve—
as well as prevailing First Amendment doctrine are essential to 
understanding the Court’s approach to false statements of fact. 
2. False Speech Under the First Amendment.  The complexity of 
First Amendment doctrine is heightened in the area of false speech 
because of a lack of clarity as to whether false speech is presumptively 
protected. False speech as an overarching category was not included 
in Chaplinsky’s proscribable-speech categories.67 Instead, the Court 
singled out a certain kind of false speech—libel—that was 
public question to have a monopoly in expressing its views to the government is the antithesis of 
constitutional guarantees.”). 
 64. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See supra text accompanying notes 59–60. Indeed, most of the categories listed in 
Chaplinsky, including lewd and profane speech, now receive at least some protection, and the 
fighting-words doctrine itself is generally regarded to be a dead letter. See 1 SMOLLA, supra note 
37, § 2:70 n.32 (noting that the Supreme Court’s decisions since Chaplinsky have narrowed the 
doctrine). The categorical approach still retains its utility, however. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383 
(“Our decisions since the 1960’s have narrowed the scope of the traditional categorical 
exceptions for defamation and for obscenity, but a limited categorical approach has remained an 
important part of our First Amendment jurisprudence.” (citations omitted)). More recently, the 
Supreme Court rejected the government’s argument that a claim for a categorical exclusion 
from First Amendment protection should be based on a simple balancing of the value of the 
speech against its societal costs, calling such a test “startling and dangerous.” See Stevens, 130 S. 
Ct. at 1585 (“The First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech does not extend only to 
categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits.”). 
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unprotected because of its injurious consequences.68 Other particular 
kinds of deceptions—including false commercial speech69 and 
fraudulent statements70—have also been found to be outside the 
purview of the First Amendment.71 In Stevens, the Court reiterated 
the distinction, identifying the historical and traditional categories of 
speech that may be restricted as obscenity, defamation, fraud, 
incitement, and speech that is integral to criminal conduct.72 Thus, 
although the Court specified two types of unprotected false speech—
defamation and fraud—it did not list false speech as a category unto 
itself. 
The Court has, however, spoken more generally about false 
speech. In 1974, the Court stated that there is no value in false 
statements of fact: 
Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. 
However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its 
correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the 
competition of other ideas. But there is no constitutional value in 
false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless 
error materially advances society’s interest in “uninhibited, robust, 
and wide-open” debate on public issues.73 
This statement, made in the context of a defamation case,74 plays 
a pivotal role in the Alvarez opinions, with the majority and dissent 
interpreting it in starkly different ways.75 Though the Gertz Court did 
 68. See supra text accompanying notes 59–60. 
 69. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771–72 
(1976) (“The First Amendment, as we construe it today, does not prohibit the State from 
insuring that the stream of commercial information flow[s] cleanly as well as freely.”). 
 70. Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., 538 U.S. 600, 606 (2003) (“[W]hen 
nondisclosure is accompanied by intentionally misleading statements designed to deceive the 
listener, the First Amendment leaves room for a fraud claim.”). 
 71. See Jonathan D. Varat, Deception and the First Amendment: A Central, Complex, and 
Somewhat Curious Relationship, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1108 (2006) (discussing governmental 
efforts to “control deceptions in the interest of protecting from serious harm our people, our 
institutions, and our very form of self-governing representative democracy”). 
 72. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1584. 
 73. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1974) (emphasis added) (footnote 
omitted) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). 
 74. In Gertz, the Court decided not to extend the protections of New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), to statements about private individuals. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347–48 
n.10. 
 75. On the one hand, the majority stated that “Gertz’s statement that false factual speech is 
unprotected, considered in isolation, omits discussion of essential constitutional qualifications 
on that proposition.” United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1203 (9th Cir. 2010). The dissent, 
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not qualify its statement that “there is no constitutional value in false 
statements of fact,” the Court’s subsequent jurisprudence belies the 
claim that the statement represented a bright line rule. The Court has 
generally required more than mere falsity to bring false speech 
outside the purview of First Amendment protection.76 Unprotected 
false speech usually has two characteristics: scienter and 
individualized harm.77 For instance, a fraud action requires a plaintiff 
to prove that a representation was made with intent to mislead.78 
Similarly, defamation actions generally require harm to an 
individual’s reputation.79 
To ensure the protection of so-called worthy speech, the Court 
has extended First Amendment protection to libel by requiring a 
heightened scienter. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,80 the Court 
held that defamation of public officials was not actionable unless it 
could be shown that the false statements at issue were made with 
“actual malice”—knowledge that the statements were false or 
reckless disregard as to whether they were true or false.81 In setting 
on the other hand, argued that “The majority has effectively overruled Gertz and inverted the 
whole scheme. The Supreme Court has told us consistently that the general rule is that false 
statements of fact are unprotected, and has carved out certain limited exceptions to this 
principle in certain contexts.” Id. at 1223 (Bybee, J., dissenting). 
 76. See infra notes 78–103 and accompanying text. 
 77. See Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 225, 238 (1992) (“Defamation and deception are actionable wrongs 
[because] . . . they vindicate private rights invoked by, or at least on behalf of, private 
individuals.”); see also Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1211 (“It is obvious . . . that [the] categories [of fraud 
and speech integral to criminal conduct] also include limiting characteristics to what speech may 
be proscribed beyond mere falsity, just as defamation law does.”). 
 78. Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., 538 U.S. 600, 621 (2003). 
 79. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 267. In the context of defamation, no cause of action for libel on 
the government exists, nor does a cause of action exist for general public frauds, deceptions, or 
defamations. Id. at 291 (“[N]o court of last resort in this country has ever held, or even 
suggested, that prosecutions for libel on government have any place in the American system of 
jurisprudence.” (emphasis added) (quoting City of Chicago v. Tribune Co., 139 N.E. 86, 88 (Ill. 
1923)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Weatherhead v. Globe Int’l, Inc., 832 F.2d 1226, 
1228 (10th Cir. 1987) (“Under group libel, ‘if . . . the statement concerns a group sufficiently 
large that it cannot reasonably be understood to apply to plaintiff particularly, it is not 
actionable in the absence of content or circumstances reasonably specifying the plaintiff 
individually.’” (omission in original) (quoting 2 FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, JR. & 
OSCAR S. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 5.7 (2d ed. 1986))); see also Fried, supra note 77, at 238 
(“[T]he First Amendment precludes punishment for generalized ‘public’ frauds, deceptions, and 
defamation.”). 
 80. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 81. Id. at 283. The Court extended this protection to statements about public figures in 
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
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this standard, the Court articulated its theory of why defamatory 
statements should be protected: not because the statements 
themselves were valuable, but because overregulating those 
statements could impermissibly chill protected speech.82 Justice 
Brennan opined: 
A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth 
of all his factual assertions—and to do so on pain of libel judgments 
virtually unlimited in amount—leads to a comparable “self-
censorship.” . . . [W]ould-be critics of official conduct may be 
deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be 
true and even though it is in fact true . . . . They tend to make only 
statements which steer far wider of the unlawful zone.83 
The same year the Court decided Sullivan, it held in Garrison v. 
Louisiana84 that the same standards applied to criminal libel 
statutes.85 It held unconstitutional a statute that punished both true 
statements made with actual malice and false statements made against 
public officials without regard to whether the statements were made 
with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard to their 
truth or falsity.86 Justice Brennan stated that because “the use of the 
known lie as a tool is . . . at odds with the premises of democratic 
government . . . . the knowingly false statement and the false 
statement made with reckless disregard of truth, do not enjoy 
constitutional protection.”87 Despite finding that false statements of 
fact are worthless, the Court nevertheless acknowledged the need to 
protect certain false statements to avoid chilling speech it deemed 
more worthy.88 
In Time, Inc. v. Hill,89 the Court applied heightened scienter 
requirements, similar to those required by Sullivan and Garrison, to a 
 82. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279. 
 83. Id. (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 84. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964). 
 85. Id. at 67. 
 86. Id. at 77–78. 
 87. Id. at 75. 
 88. See id. at 78 (“The New York Times standard forbids the punishment of false 
statements, unless made with knowledge of their falsity or in reckless disregard of whether they 
are true or false.”). 
 89. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
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false-light claim.90 The appellee claimed that Time magazine, in a 
story about a play, gave the impression that the play was an accurate 
portrayal of his family’s experience of being held hostage.91 In fact, 
the play was based on a novel that fictionalized the experience, and 
the appellee sued under a New York privacy statute.92 The Court held 
that “the constitutional protections for speech and press preclude the 
application of the New York statute to redress false reports of 
matters of public interest in the absence of proof that the defendant 
published the report with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless 
disregard of the truth.”93 
In considering false speech in the context of a campaign, the 
Court has likewise required an element of heightened intent. In 1976, 
the Court in Schwartz v. Vanasco94 summarily affirmed a three-judge 
district court ruling that facially invalidated a portion of the New 
York campaign code.95 The challenged sections banned, among other 
things, “[m]isrepresentation of any candidate’s qualifications,” 
including “personal vilification” and “scurrilous attacks,”96 as well as 
any misrepresentation of a candidate’s position,97 party affiliation, or 
endorsement.98 After citing Garrison’s language about the “use of the 
known lie as a tool,” the district court stated that if the political 
statement were made with “actual malice,” it did not enjoy 
 90. Id. at 389 (“[S]anctions against either innocent or negligent misstatement would 
prevent a grave hazard of discouraging the press from exercising the constitutional 
guarantees.”). False light is a theory of invasion of privacy. Cantrell v. Forest City Publ’g Co., 
419 U.S. 245, 248 n.2 (1974). As the Court has explained, “Publicity that places the plaintiff in a 
false light in the public eye is generally recognized as one of the several distinct kinds of 
invasions actionable under the privacy rubric.” Id. 
 91. Cantrell, 419 U.S. at 378. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 387–88. 
 94. Schwartz v. Vanasco, 423 U.S. 1041 (1976), aff’g mem. 401 F. Supp. 87 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). 
 95. Id. at 1041. The case arose out of a lawsuit filed by two candidates for the New York 
State Assembly. Vanasco v. Schwartz, 401 F. Supp. 87, 89–90 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), aff’d mem., 423 
U.S. 1041 (1976). Roy Vanasco was found to have misrepresented his party affiliation by 
distributing materials with “Republican-Liberal” on them when he was on the ballot as simply a 
Republican. Id. at 89. Joseph Ferris was found to have made misrepresentations about his 
opponent’s voting record in campaign literature and in remarks to a local newspaper. Id. at 89–
90. A third plaintiff, Robert Postel, filed suit after he was ordered to stop distributing literature 
that his opponent had complained about to the elections board. Id. at 90. 
 96. Fair Campaign Code § 6201.1(c)–(f), N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 6201.1(c)–
(f) (1974), reprinted in Vanasco, 401 F. Supp. at 101–02. 
 97. Id. § 6201.1(e). 
 98. Id. § 6201.1(f). 
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constitutional protection.99 The problem with New York’s code, the 
district court found, was that it did not limit punishment to those 
statements made with knowledge of the statements’ falsity or with 
reckless disregard for the truth.100 As such, the statute risked chilling 
protected political speech.101 Had the statute been more narrowly 
drawn to protect misrepresentations that were neither knowingly nor 
recklessly made, the provision might have been upheld.102 The 
Supreme Court’s summary affirmance of the district court’s ruling 
thus suggested a willingness to exclude recklessly or knowingly false 
statements from First Amendment protection in the context of 
political campaigns, but the Court has never ruled directly on the 
issue.103 
 99. Vanasco, 401 F. Supp. at 91 (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). The court went on to say that, keeping in mind that political 
speech about public officers and public figures is the area in which the First Amendment “has its 
fullest and most urgent application[,] . . . . we can agree with the Board’s argument that 
calculated falsehoods are of such slight social value that no matter what the context in which 
they are made, they are not constitutionally protected.” Id. at 93 (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. 
Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 100. Id. at 96. 
 101. Id. at 97. 
 102. See id. at 100 (“Nothing in our decision downgrades the state’s legitimate interest in 
insuring fair and honest elections. Undoubtedly, deliberate calculated falsehoods when used by 
political candidates can lead to public cynicism and apathy toward the electoral process.”). 
 103. The Court’s willingness to regulate false speech in the context of political campaigns 
could be based on its recognition of a compelling interest in protecting the integrity of the 
electoral process. In Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982), the Court recognized that “the 
States have a legitimate interest in preserving the integrity of their electoral processes.” Id. at 
52. Despite that fact, the Court held that a Kentucky corruption statute had been applied 
unconstitutionally to invalidate the election of the defendant. Id. at 62. The defendant had 
promised to serve at a lower salary than that fixed by law if elected, a promise that was barred 
by the statute. Id. at 48. As the defendant could not deliver on the promise, the Court analyzed 
it as a falsehood, and found that the statute did not provide the “breathing space” necessary for 
free expression, id. at 61 (quoting N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted), because it required the defendant’s “election victory [to] be voided 
even if the offending statement was made in good faith and was quickly repudiated.” Id. 
According to the court, the chilling effect of such absolute accountability for factual 
misstatements in the course of political debate is incompatible with the atmosphere of free 
discussion contemplated by the First Amendment in the context of political campaigns.” Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 
788–89 (1978) (“Preserving the integrity of the electoral process, preventing corruption, and 
‘sustain[ing] the active, alert responsibility of the individual citizen in a democracy for the wise 
conduct of government’ are interests of the highest importance.” (alteration in original) 
(footnote omitted) (quoting United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 575 (1957))); Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1976) (per curiam) (“In a republic where the people are sovereign, the 
ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among candidates for office is essential, for the 
identities of those who are elected will inevitably shape the course that we follow as a nation.”). 
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Though the Supreme Court has said that false statements of fact 
are unworthy of constitutional protection, its jurisprudence reveals 
that, generally, only false statements of fact that are made with a 
culpable state of mind and that result in individualized harm are 
unprotected. Because the Court has not ruled on a case in which a 
speaker made a false statement of fact that was not defamatory, 
fraudulent, or sufficiently misleading to satisfy the requirements of a 
false-light claim, lower courts have drawn from the ill-fitting contours 
of Chaplinsky, Sullivan, and Gertz on the rare occasions when they 
have considered such cases.104 
The Court’s statements in those cases make clear that its 
jurisprudence dealing with false statements of fact and other 
categories of unprotected speech is grounded in the truth-seeking 
function of free speech advanced by both the marketplace-of-ideas 
theory and the self-governance theory of First Amendment 
protection for speech. In Chaplinksy, the Court explicitly said as 
much, stating that the unprotected categories of speech are “no 
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of . . . slight social 
value as a step to truth.”105 Such a conception of the value of speech 
presupposes that value is based on a contribution to the search for 
truth. Speech that does not enhance this value is not worthy of 
protection. In Sullivan, the Court relied on a similar conception of 
speech to come to its decision that some erroneous statements of fact 
must be protected not because they have inherent value, but because 
regulating them too harshly might chill other, worthier speech.106 
Gertz similarly found that false statements of fact lack constitutional 
value because they do not “materially advance[] society’s interest in 
the ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate on public issues.”107 
Despite its frequent reliance on these theories, the Court has not 
explained its basis for the assumption that the sole, or most 
important, reason for protecting speech is its ability to advance the 
search for truth. Part II argues that reasons exist to protect false 
speech, even if such speech does not aid in the search for truth. 
 104. See infra Part I.B. 
 105. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). 
 106. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271–72 (“[E]rroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, 
and . . . it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ that 
they ‘need . . . to survive’ . . . .” (second omission in original) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 
U.S. 415, 433 (1963))). 
 107. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 
270). 
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B. Lower Court Decisions Dealing with False Statements of Fact 
As discussed,108 the Supreme Court has not yet considered a case 
like Alvarez in which a deceptive statement that does not fall within 
the traditionally unprotected categories is punished without regard to 
its context, intent, or harm. Many lower court decisions that reference 
false statements of fact and the First Amendment outside of the 
campaign context concern defamation and false-light claims109 or 
claims about the right of public employees to make false statements 
on matters of public concern.110 The decisions that do not concern 
defamation often involve speech in a specific context, such as a 
prison,111 that makes the interest in restricting speech compelling.112 
 108. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 109. See, e.g., Carr v. Forbes, Inc., 259 F.3d 273, 282 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that a developer 
who had sued a publisher for defamation was a limited public figure who was required to show 
that the publisher had acted with actual malice); Horne v. Russell Cnty. Comm’n, 379 F. Supp. 
2d 1305, 1341 (M.D. Ala. 2005) (granting the defendants’ summary judgment motion in 
response to the plaintiff’s action, which combined claims for both false light and invasion of 
privacy, because the plaintiff had shown no evidence that rumors about her were spread with 
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard as to whether they were false). 
 110. See, e.g., Brasslett v. Cota, 761 F.2d 827, 844 (1st Cir. 1985) (“[E]rroneous statements of 
public concern will be protected unless they are shown to have interfered with the employee’s 
performance or the regular operation of his governmental agency.”). 
 111. For example, in Nicholas v. O’Connor, No. 98-2049, 2000 WL 253700 (2d Cir. Mar. 1, 
2000), the Second Circuit rejected a prison inmate’s claim that his First Amendment rights had 
been violated, holding that he had no constitutional right to make false statements to 
correctional officers. Id. at *1. The court cited Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 
(1990), for the proposition that there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. 
Nicholas, 2000 WL 253700, at *1 (citing Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18). It also cited the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), which upheld restrictions on inmate-to-
inmate correspondence that were reasonably related to “legitimate penological interests.” 
Nicholas, 2000 WL 253700, at *1 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, 91). 
 112. Lower court decisions related to false statements of fact outside the traditionally 
unprotected categories often involve unique fact situations. In Chaker v. Cogran, 428 F.3d 1215 
(9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit held that a law making it a crime to knowingly file a false 
report of peace-officer misconduct was impermissible viewpoint discrimination because it did 
not also punish knowingly filing a false report in support of a peace officer. Id. at 1227–28. In 
Michigan Protection & Advocacy Service, Inc. v. Babin, 799 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Mich. 1992), the 
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan rejected an argument that defendants 
who present facts instead of opinions during a protest lose their First Amendment rights. Id. at 
721 n.50. The court noted that it had not found 
any case law stating that private persons engaging in valid, nondefamatory protest 
activities lose their First Amendment protection if they make a false statement of 
fact. Rather, those cases holding that false statements of fact are not protected are 
generally libel or defamation suits or statements by public officials. The Court is 
unaware of any decision that has held that a private, nonlibellous comment may be 
denied First Amendment protection simply because it is alleged to be based on fact 
rather than on opinion. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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Alvarez thus poses a unique constitutional question that most lower 
courts have yet to tackle and on which the Supreme Court has yet to 
offer guidance. 
Lower courts have shown a willingness to uphold restrictions on 
false speech in the campaign context when those restrictions require 
an element of intent. In Pestrak v. Ohio Elections Commission,113 the 
Sixth Circuit upheld provisions of an Ohio election statute that 
allowed the Commission to initiate investigations into false 
statements made during campaigns, to refer matters for prosecution, 
and to state its opinion on the truth or falsity of matters within its 
purview.114 In doing so, the Sixth Circuit relied on the Supreme 
Court’s statements in Gertz to find that portions of the statute that 
punished making a false statement either knowingly or with reckless 
disregard to its falsity came within the Supreme Court’s holdings in 
Garrison and Sullivan.115 The court interpreted those cases to mean 
that “false speech, even political speech, does not merit constitutional 
protection if the speaker knows of the falsehood or recklessly 
disregards the truth.”116 
Likewise, in Tomei v. Finley,117 the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois granted an injunction against the 
Democratic defendant’s use of the acronym “REP” during a 
campaign.118 The Democrats had formed the “Representation for 
Every Person Party” and used the campaign slogan “Vote REP April 
7” on campaign literature, signs, and buttons.119 The court noted that 
use of the acronym “reflected what the trademark infringement cases 
term a strong ‘likelihood of confusion’” because the acronym REP is 
frequently used to refer to Republicans.120 In reaching its decision to 
grant the injunction, the court relied on language from Garrison 
explaining that “the use of the known lie as a tool is at once at odds 
with the premises of democratic government and with the orderly 
manner in which economic, social, or political change is to be 
effected.”121 The court wrote that the acronym was not an expression 
 113. Pestrak v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 926 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1991). 
 114. Id. at 575. 
 115. Id. at 577. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Tomei v. Finley, 512 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
 118. Id. at 696. 
 119. Id. at 696–97. 
 120. Id. at 697. 
 121. Id. at 697–98 (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964)). 
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of ideas at all, or that if it were, it was a deliberately false 
expression.122 
The Washington Supreme Court, however, has struck down 
restrictions on speech in the campaign context as violating the First 
Amendment, despite the Supreme Court’s apparent willingness to 
regulate deceptive campaign speech in Schwartz v. Vanasco.123 In 
State ex rel. Public Disclosure Commission v. 119 Vote No! 
Committee,124 the Washington court struck down a statute that 
prohibited any person from sponsoring, with actual malice, a political 
advertisement containing a false statement of material fact.125 The 
court reasoned that the statute sought to regulate protected political 
speech, and that the truth or falsity of the speech was irrelevant to the 
constitutional inquiry.126 The court proceeded to apply strict scrutiny 
to the statute, holding that the state’s interest in “foster[ing] an 
informed electorate” did not justify its intrusion on protected 
speech.127 It found the state’s reliance on Gertz and the law of 
defamation to be inapposite, as the state was seeking to punish speech 
when there had been no harm to a
In 2007, the Washington Supreme Court revisited the issue in 
Rickert v. State Public Disclosure Commission,129 striking down a law 
that attempted to address the attributes that had made the statute 
unconstitutional in 119 Vote No! Committee.130 The new statute 
provided that it would be a violation to sponsor, with actual malice, 
“[p]olitical advertising or an electioneering communication that 
 122. Id. at 698. 
 123. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 124. State ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n v. 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d 691 (Wash. 
1998). 
 125. Id. at 699. The state’s Public Disclosure Commission brought suit against the 119 Vote 
No! Committee over its political advertisement suggesting that Initiative 119, if passed, would 
have allowed assisted suicide. Id. at 693. The commission alleged that the advertisement 
misrepresented the initiative by suggesting that it invited assisted suicide without sufficient 
safeguards. Id. 
 126. Id. at 695 (“The State asserts that it may prohibit false statements of fact contained in 
political advertisements. This claim presupposes the State possesses an independent right to 
determine truth and falsity in political debate. However, the courts have ‘consistently refused to 
recognize an exception for any test of truth—whether administered by judges, juries, or 
administrative officials—and especially one that puts the burden of proving truth on the 
speaker.’” (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1963))). 
 127. Id. at 697. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Rickert v. State Pub. Disclosure Comm’n, 168 P.3d 826 (Wash. 2007). 
 130. Id. at 827. 
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contains a false statement of material fact about a candidate for 
public office.”131 Lawmakers apparently hoped that by limiting the 
statute’s regulations to statements made “about a candidate for public 
office,” they could avoid the problem of the statute’s punishing 
speech that did not harm an individual, which was the problem that 
the court had identified in 119 Vote No! Committee.132 The court held 
that the additional language did not prevent invalidation because the 
statute applied to protected speech and was thus subject to strict 
scrutiny, which it failed.133 The court extended First Amendment 
protection to the speech at issue because it was political speech, which 
is entitled to the utmost protection.134 It noted that lawmakers might 
have intended to limit the statute’s scope to unprotected defamatory 
statements, but that the statute did not require proof of the 
defamatory nature of punishable statements.135 In applying strict 
scrutiny, the court held that protecting candidates was not a 
compelling interest, and that, in any case, the statute did not address 
the reputational harms that it purported to combat.136 Further, 
according to the court, the statute was not narrowly tailored to 
address the asserted interest in preserving the integrity of elections 
because it did not prohibit lies told about oneself.137 
The preceding discussion shows that, although lower courts often 
cite the Supreme Court’s statements that there is no constitutional 
value in false statements of fact, they may be hesitant to find all false 
statements of fact as outside First Amendment protection. Campaign-
speech cases in particular indicate that much confusion still exists 
among lower courts about how to treat false statements that do not 
rise to the level of defamation, fraud, or false light. The next Part 
argues that such statements deserve protection. 
 131. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17.530(1) (West 2006). 
 132. Rickert, 168 P.3d at 827; see also supra text accompanying notes 123–128. 
 133. Rickert, 168 P.3d at 832. 
 134. Id. at 828 (“[T]he First Amendment has its fullest and most urgent application to 
speech uttered during a campaign for political office.” (alteration in original) (quoting Burson v. 
Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 196 (1992) (plurality opinion)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 135. Id. at 829. 
 136. Id. at 830. 
 137. Id. at 831. 
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II.  REASONS FOR PROTECTING FALSE STATEMENTS OF FACT 
As noted in Part I, the Supreme Court seems to have accepted 
the proposition that false statements of fact are unworthy of 
protection for their own sake.138 This analysis is grounded in the idea 
that “[n]either the intentional lie nor the careless error materially 
advances society’s interest in ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ 
debate on public issues.”139 Though it puts the intentional lie and the 
careless error on equal footing for their lack of contribution to public 
discourse, the Court affords the careless error—or at least the error 
made without “actual malice”—some protection to avoid chilling 
speech it deems worthy.140 It has yet to directly address whether the 
intentional lie should likewise be protected to avoid adverse 
constitutional consequences. This Part argues that, regardless of 
whether false statements have constitutional value, there are 
important reasons for protecting them. 
Some scholars and philosophers argue that false statements have 
intrinsic value.141 Justice Brennan quoted John Stuart Mill when he 
addressed the inherent value of false speech in a footnote in Sullivan: 
“Even a false statement may be deemed to make a valuable 
contribution to public debate, since it brings about ‘the clearer 
perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision 
 138. See supra text accompanying note 73. 
 139. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). 
 140. Id. at 340–41. 
 141. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 18 (David Spitz ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 
1975) (1859) (“[T]he peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing 
the human race . . . . If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging 
error for truth: if wrong, they lose . . . the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth 
produced, by its collision with error.”). Professor R. George Wright argues in a forthcoming 
article that lies have value in and of themselves and may contribute to the values that underlie 
the First Amendment. See R. George Wright, Lying and Freedom of Speech, 2011 UTAH L. 
REV. (forthcoming). He discusses lies told to protect fugitive slaves before the Civil War and 
Jews during World War II as examples of lies that have value and advance First Amendment 
goals. Id. Professor Mark Tushnet argues that both “white lies” and lies that allow people to 
“re-construct” themselves may have social value. Tushnet, supra note 24, at 11. But see 
Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLA L. REV. 897, 905 (2010) (arguing 
that John Stuart Mill “makes clear that his conclusions about the liberty of thought and 
discussion pertain to issues of ‘morals, religion, politics, social relations, and the business of 
life,’” but not to science or other demonstrable facts (quoting MILL, supra, at 36)). 
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with error.’”142 Nevertheless, as discussed in the previous Part, the 
Court has not embraced this theory. 
Assuming that false statements of fact have no inherent value, 
there are still compelling reasons to protect false statements that are 
not defamatory or fraudulent. These reasons generally fall into two 
categories. The first category comprises liberty concerns, which 
include avoiding setting up the government as an arbiter of truth, 
promoting privacy and autonomy, and protecting other valuable 
speech. The second category contains pragmatic concerns, which 
include avoiding the difficulty of separating truth from fiction and 
facts from opinions, and promoting ease of administration. 
A. Liberty Concerns 
Various First Amendment scholars have noted the danger 
inherent in allowing the government to routinely decide matters of 
truth and falsity.143 Indeed, the First Amendment seems designed to 
avoid such government control of truth, thought, and belief, with its 
prohibition on government establishment of religion and abridgement 
of speech.144 This notion of liberty underlies several of the theories of 
First Amendment protection, including the individual-self-fulfillment 
theory and the self-governance theory.145 To have the free exchange 
of ideas necessary to the self-governance and truth-seeking functions 
 142. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279 n.19 (quoting J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859), reprinted in J.S. 
MILL, ON LIBERTY AND CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 1, 15 (R.B. 
McCallum ed., Basil Blackwell 1947)). But see Steven D. Smith, Skepticism, Tolerance, and 
Truth in the Theory of Free Expression, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 649, 668–69 (1987) (attacking the 
idea that a competition between true and false statements will increase knowledge as dependent 
on the contradictory assertion that the government cannot—but individual people can—be 
trusted to sort truth from fiction); Mark Spottswood, Falsity, Insincerity, and the Freedom of 
Expression, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1203, 1203–04 (2008) (arguing that the benefits of 
false speech do not accrue to speech that is insincere). 
 143. See generally SCHAUER, supra note 32, at 85–86 (“Freedom of speech is based in large 
part on a distrust of the ability of government to make the necessary distinctions, a distrust of 
governmental determinations of truth and falsity, [and] an appreciation of the fallibility of 
political leaders . . . .”); Gey, supra note 35, at 16–22 (“[C]ollective political control of speech is 
inconsistent with democratic self-governance not because it will lead to more social evils in the 
form of bad political results, but rather because free speech regulation undermines the very 
character of the democratic political system itself.”); Geoffrey R. Stone, The Rules of Evidence 
and the Rules of Public Debate, 1993 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 127, 140 (noting “the danger of putting 
government in the position routinely to decide the truth or falsity of all statements in public 
debate”). 
 144. See Gey, supra note 35, at 18 (“[A]s in the religion area, the government is prohibited 
by the speech clauses . . . from using the law to enforce its ideology on those who disagree.”). 
 145. See supra Part I.A.1. 
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of the First Amendment, the government must allow free debate. If 
the government were to involve itself in fact-checking speech, it 
would expand its control over the content of sp
Another potential danger in allowing the government to punish 
false statements of fact is the prospect of government intrusion into 
people’s lives. If the government could punish false statements of fact 
without regard to context, intent, or harm, it could ostensibly punish 
any false statement a person makes, even about himself.146 To 
determine truth or falsity, the government would need to investigate 
a person’s background. Most Americans would likely balk at the 
prospect of such an investigation.147 Though it may be far-fetched to 
imagine the government attempting to regulate such private aspects 
of our lives as statements made online or to friends,148 liberty and 
privacy interests are nevertheless best served by a blanket protection 
that limits the ability of government to take a step down such a road 
of regulation. 
Protection for false statements of fact also promotes autonomy 
and self-fulfillment. If self-fulfillment is framed in terms of the 
autonomy of the individual to control his life and his self image, the 
freedom to make false statements has some inherent value.149 History, 
literature, and popular culture are filled with examples of people who 
have lied about their pasts. For instance, Jay Gatsby claimed he was a 
wealthy dilettante and war hero, but he was revealed to be a 
bootlegger.150 James Frey’s memoir, A Million Little Pieces,151 was 
 146. See infra Part III.C. 
 147. Professor Frederick Schauer notes that the debate during the 1950s between an 
absolutist vision of the First Amendment and a balancing approach was framed by a Supreme 
Court that was “largely passive in the face of McCarthyism.” Frederick Schauer, Freedom of 
Expression Adjudication in Europe and America: A Case Study in Comparative Constitutional 
Architecture 18 (John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Harvard Univ., Faculty Research Working 
Papers Series, Paper No. RWP05-019, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=668523. 
Professor Schauer explains that “the debate . . . was significantly about a distrust of discretion 
and significantly about a fear of the official ability to assess accurately the dangers that might 
come from speaking, writing, and printing.” Id. at 18–19. 
 148. See infra Part III.C. 
 149. See Varat, supra note 71, at 1109 (“Such a regime [of regulation of deception] also 
could interfere with expressive autonomy and tend to inhibit creativity and experimentation, 
privacy, and the joys and solace that may come from spreading small, private, or otherwise 
benign delusions.”). 
 150. F. SCOTT FITZGERALD, THE GREAT GATSBY 78–80, 160–61 (1925). 
 151. JAMES FREY, A MILLION LITTLE PIECES (2003). 
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found to be filled with exaggerations and falsehoods.152 Motives for 
such false statements differ and may include creative expression, the 
desire to impress others, or the need to bury past trauma, but all of 
these motives share the common thread of allowing a person to shape 
the image he presents to the world.153 The closest the Court has come 
to expressing concern for the autonomy of the individual is Justice 
Marshall’s statement in Procunier that the First Amendment serves 
the need of the human spirit for expression.154 This conception would 
necessarily protect both true and false statements about oneself.155 
Finally, the value of protecting false speech to avoid chilling 
valuable protected speech is well entrenched in First Amendment 
doctrine.156 It is raised as a principal reason in Sullivan for requiring 
actual malice in actions for defamation of public officials.157 Likewise, 
the Court in Gertz noted that “[a]lthough the erroneous statement of 
fact is not worthy of constitutional protection, it is nevertheless 
inevitable in free debate.”158 Punishing false statements, absent a 
heightened scienter requirement, could impermissibly chill political 
dissent. Moreover, regulating false ideas could infringe on belief 
systems, since opinions on policy matters are often based on disputed 
 152. A Million Little Pieces was discovered to be filled with falsehoods and exaggerations, 
though it was billed as a memoir. Edward Wyatt, Writer Says He Made Up Some Details, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 12, 2006, at A20. Frey’s falsehoods come closer to fraud because he used them to 
sell books for profit. 
 153. See Varat, supra note 71, at 1108 (discussing kinds of deception, including 
“intentionally concealing one’s identity in order to conduct undercover operations, maintain 
privacy, ward off retaliation for unpopular belief, or disguise who is really funding a candidate 
or a ballot measure”). 
 154. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text. 
 155. Of course, one person’s autonomy may interfere with another’s. If a candidate for 
office lies about having served in a war, he takes away the voters’ autonomy in choosing a 
candidate who aligns with their beliefs and criteria for what makes a good leader. See supra note 
29. This infringement on the voters’ ability to choose also ties into the self-governance theory: 
when candidates lie, the ability of voters to govern themselves is diminished. 
 156. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–72 (1964) (“That erroneous 
statement is inevitable in free debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms of 
expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ that they ‘need . . . to survive’ was also 
recognized . . . in [Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457 (D.C. Cir. 1942)].” (first omission in 
original) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963))). 
 157. Id. at 279 (“A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all 
his factual assertions—and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount—
leads to a comparable ‘self-censorship.’ . . . Under such a rule, would-be critics of official 
conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and 
even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the 
expense of having to do so.”). 
 158. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974). 
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facts. For example, despite significant evidence that global warming is 
occurring and is largely caused by human activity,159 opinions on the 
seriousness of the phenomenon differ,160 and some skeptics even 
doubt its existence.161 Political dissent could be chilled were the 
government to restrict speech on certain facts that underlie opinions. 
The same liberty concerns that underlie free-speech doctrine—
government interference with speech, government intrusion into 
private lives, individual autonomy, and the chilling of protected 
speech—are implicated by and weigh in favor of protection for false 
statements of fact. 
B. Pragmatic Concerns 
There are also practical reasons to favor presumptive protection 
of false speech. Related to the danger inherent in giving the 
government control over the content of speech is the substantive 
difficulty in differentiating truth from fiction.162 If there were a bright 
line between truth and fiction or fact and opinion, it would be easier 
to regulate false statements of fact without risking harm to other 
protected speech. 
In reality, however, the lines are often blurry. Some statements 
are clearly verifiable facts: “He was born in New York” or “Water 
freezes at thirty-two degrees Fahrenheit.” Some statements are 
 159. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Summary for Policymakers, in 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 1, 10 (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007), 
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_
report_wg1_report_the_physical_science_basis.htm (“Most of the observed increase in global 
average temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations.”). 
 160. Poll: Global Warming Fears Cooling, CNN (Mar. 14, 2011, 10:31 AM ET), http://
politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2011/03/14/poll-global-warming-fears-cooling (reporting that 41 
percent of respondents to a Gallup poll think “the seriousness of global warming is 
‘exaggerated’”). 
 161. Oriana Zill de Granados, The Doubters of Global Warming, FRONTLINE (Apr. 24, 
2007), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/hotpolitics/reports/skeptics.html (profiling 
“five . . . famous skeptics” who question “whether global warming is really occurring, whether 
human activity is truly to blame and whether rising temperatures are such a bad thing”). 
 162. See Gey, supra note 35, at 17 (“[T]he structural-rights perspective relies on a 
metaphysical assertion about the nature of truth and the role of collective entities in 
ascertaining that truth. The structural interpretation assumes, in the properly construed 
Holmesian tradition, that all assertions of truth are incomplete, inevitably flawed, and probably 
tendentious.”). See generally Christopher P. Guzelian, True and False Speech, 51 B.C. L. REV. 
669, 689–96 (2010) (examining aspects of speech that hinder courts from arriving at predictable 
results—literalism, semiotics, and the requirement that defamatory speech be “provably 
false”—and arguing that a better standard is “knowably false” speech). 
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clearly opinion: “I think that candidate is the best person for the job.” 
Others are less easily categorized. The Supreme Court explained in 
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.163 that a statement of opinion can 
imply a statement of fact: “If a speaker says, ‘In my opinion John 
Jones is a liar,’ he implies a knowledge of facts which lead to the 
conclusion that Jones told an untruth.”164 The Court thus refused to 
create an “artificial dichotomy” between fact and opinion in 
defamation law.165 Professor Mark Tushnet notes the danger in 
allowing the government to regulate facts that are “ideologically 
inflected” or associated with wider views about politics: “One might 
be nervous about licensing the government to regulate—and 
specifically to impose criminal sanctions on—the dissemination of 
false statements in this category, because the government might use 
the false statements as a lever for suppressing the wider ideological 
views . . . .”166 For instance, the government could punish Holocaust 
denial as a way to reach right-wing extremist organizations whose 
other views are protected by the First Amendment.167 
The same difficulty inheres in distinguishing truth from fiction. 
Some statements are clearly either true or false, but others are harder 
to classify.168 People often use language to technically say one thing 
while implying another. A perusal of the archives of any organization 
that fact-checks politicians’ statements confirms as much.169 For 
example, Senator Rand Paul said in 2010 that the average federal 
employee earned $120,000 per year, whereas the average private-
 163. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990). 
 164. Id. at 18. 
 165. Id. at 19. 
 166. Tushnet, supra note 24, at 18. 
 167. Id. 
 168. If a man was born in New York but says he was born in Oregon, he is making a false 
statement. If he says he was born in New York, he is making a true statement. For a discussion 
of the dearth of attention paid to “questions of hard fact” in First Amendment theory, see 
Schauer, supra note 141, at 899. 
 169. See, e.g., Robert Farley, Michele Bachmann Claims There Has Been Just One New Oil 
Drilling Permit Issued Since Obama Took Office, POLITIFACT.COM (Mar. 29, 2011, 6:02 PM), 
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2011/mar/29/michele-bachmann/michele-
bachmann-claims-there-has-been-just-one-ne (explaining that presidential candidate Michele 
Bachmann’s claim that President Obama has issued only one new oil-drilling permit is 
“ridiculously false”); Eugene Kiely, Lori Robertson, D’Angelo Gore, Brooks Jackson, Michael 
Morse & Lara Seligman, Budget Spin, FACTCHECK.ORG (Feb. 16, 2011, 5:43 PM), http://fact
check.org/2011/02/budget-spin (“Democrats and Republicans disagree strongly about elements 
of President Obama’s 2012 budget, but they are alike in one respect: Both sides are 
misrepresenting important facts.”). 
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sector employee earned $60,000.170 The figures were technically true, 
but they included salary and benefits.171 In salary alone, the average 
federal employee earned about $80,000, whereas the average private-
sector employee earned $50,000.172 Considering these figures, the gap 
thus shrank from $60,000 to $30,000. Senator Paul’s statement, 
although technically true, was likely calculated to mislead the average 
listener by making the gap between public and private salaries seem 
wider. These kinds of misrepresentations, and even outright lies, 
abound in the political discourse.173 
Moreover, facts that are accepted as true may turn out to be 
false, and vice versa.174 Thus, giving the government the power to 
suppress speech it deems to be false may ultimately suppress speech 
that is actually true. History is replete with facts that were accepted as 
beyond question but that were later disproved. For example, until the 
mid-twentieth century, medicine was based around the idea of the 
“four humors,” a theory that has now been discredited.175 Under a 
system that suppresses all supposedly false ideas, proponents of more 
modern scientific views would not have been allowed to state their 
ideas—and then those truths would not have gained traction and been 
verified and accepted. 
This difficulty in differentiating truth from fiction is heightened 
in the context of lies about oneself. Take, for instance, a statute that 
punishes résumé lies in private contexts. Though it might be fairly 
easy to determine whether someone worked for a certain company or 
went to a certain school, it might not be so easy to determine what his 
job entailed. Statements are open to differing interpretations, and the 
 170. Louis Jacobson, Rand Paul Says Federal Workers Paid $120,000, Private-Sector 
Workers Only $60,000, POLITIFACT.COM (Nov. 11, 2010, 10:30 AM), http://www.politifact.com
/truth-o-meter/statements/2010/nov/11/rand-paul/rand-paul-says-federal-workers-paid-120000-
private. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. See supra note 169. 
 174. See MILL, supra note 141, at 18 (“[T]he opinion which it is attempted to suppress by 
authority may possibly be true. Those who desire to suppress it, of course deny its truth; but 
they are not infallible.”). 
 175. LOIS N. MAGNER, A HISTORY OF THE LIFE SCIENCES 25–27 (3d ed. 2002). Doctors 
believed that the human body contained four fluids or humors—black bile, yellow bile, phlegm, 
and blood—and that people were healthy when the four were in balance. Id. 
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line between misstatements and lies is often unclear.176 For example, 
an employee may believe that he supervised a certain project, but his 
employer may think that he merely participated. If a statute 
differentiating between truth and fiction were in place in this 
jurisdiction, courts would be put in the unenviable position of sorting 
out the truth of the person’s background. Though courts have proven 
themselves capable of sophisticated line drawing in the defamation 
context, efficiency interests would be better served if courts were not 
required to engage in the exercise unnecessarily. Because of the 
difficulty that inheres in separating truth from fiction, a rule that 
presumptively protects false statements of fact would be easier for 
courts to administer. Although efficiency interests must always be 
balanced against the interest in the fair administration of justice, little 
harm exists in presumptively protecting false statements of fact, given 
that lies that create concrete harm are already subject to regulation.177 
III.  APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK TO THE STOLEN VALOR ACT 
As Parts I and II argue, uncertainty persists as to whether false 
statements of fact that fall outside the clearly defined categories of 
unprotected false speech are protected under the First Amendment, 
but there are compelling reasons why they should be. This Part 
applies the foregoing discussion to the Stolen Valor Act to show that 
the Ninth Circuit was correct in striking down the Act as 
unconstitutional. 
A. The Stolen Valor Act and Related Litigation 
The portion of the Stolen Valor Act that prohibits false claims of 
military decoration provides: 
Whoever falsely represents himself or herself, verbally or in writing, 
to have been awarded any decoration or medal authorized by 
Congress for the Armed Forces of the United States, any of the 
service medals or badges awarded to the members of such forces, 
the ribbon, button, or rosette of any such badge, decoration, or 
 176. See Spottswood, supra note 142, at 1226 (“[T]here is in fact a continuum of belief states, 
representing incremental increases or decreases in our confidence regarding certain facts about 
the world.”). 
 177. See supra Part I.A.2. 
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medal, or any colorable imitation of such item shall be fined under 
this title, imprisoned not more than six months, or both.178 
The statute was added to an existing provision that criminalizes 
knowingly wearing, purchasing, or selling any decoration or medal 
authorized by Congress for the armed forces.179 At the time the 
statute was enacted, Congress made findings that fraudulent claims 
about medals damage the reputation and meaning of the decorations 
and medals.180 Congress also found that federal law-enforcement 
officers have limited abilities to prosecute such fraudulent claims, and 
that legislative action was necessary to protect the reputation and 
meaning of the medals.181 
Although prosecutions under the Stolen Valor Act appear to 
have been rare in the first five years following its passage, several 
cases have garnered attention. Alvarez was charged with violating the 
Stolen Valor Act after he made a false claim about receiving the 
Congressional Medal of Honor at a meeting of the local water 
board.182 The FBI obtained a recording of the meeting and indicted 
him in the District Court for the Central District of California for 
violating the Act,183 which provides enhanced penalties for claims 
made about the Congressional Medal of Honor.184 He pled guilty and 
was sentenced to pay a $100 special assessment and a $5,000 fine, to 
serve a three-year term of probation, and to perform 416 hours of 
community service.185 The Ninth Circuit held the Act unconstitutional 
in August 2010, thus overturning his conviction.186 
Similarly, Strandlof’s web of lies187 began to unravel in April 2009 
when a Fort Carson legislative liaison called to check on Strandlof’s 
claim that he had worked for Senator Mark Udall.188 After the truth 
was revealed, Strandlof was charged with violating the Stolen Valor 
Act, but the charges were dismissed by the U.S. District Court for the 
 178. Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2006). 
 179. 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2000). 
 180. Stolen Valor Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-437, § 2, 120 Stat. 3266, 3266 (2006). 
 181. Id. 
 182. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text. 
 183. United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1201 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 184. 18 U.S.C. § 704(c)(1) (2006). 
 185. Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1201. 
 186. See id. at 1200 (holding the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment). 
 187. See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text. 
 188. Simpson, supra note 4. 
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District of Colorado.189 The government appealed to the Tenth 
Circuit, which heard oral argument in May 2011.190 
A third man, Ronnie Robbins, was charged with violating the 
Act after he distributed campaign materials that said he was a 
recipient of the Vietnam Service Medal and the Vietnam Campaign 
Medal.191 Though Robbins had served in the Army from 1972 to 1975, 
he never served overseas or in a combat capacity, and he did not earn 
any medals.192 In January 2011, the District Court for the Western 
District of Virginia disagreed with the Ninth Circuit and the District 
of Colorado and held that the Stolen Valor Act was constitutional.193 
In that case, United States v. Robbins,194 Judge James Jones concluded 
that the statute should be read narrowly to require that the defendant 
intended to deceive.195 Having adopted this construction, Judge Jones 
found that the false speech at issue in the Act fell outside First 
Amendment protection.196 
Judge Jones’s adoption of a limiting construction to avoid 
striking down the Stolen Valor Act illustrates the breadth of the Act’s 
language. As Judge Jones noted, the language does not require an 
element of scienter, referring only to one who “falsely represents 
himself” as having received medals.197 Nor does it require any 
concrete harm, such as that required by defamation statutes.198 
Instead, it criminalizes the mere claim that one had earned a medal. 
Finally, the statute contains no contextual limit. Although the Court 
 189. United States v. Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1185 (D. Colo. 2010). In August 2011, 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland also dismissed charges brought under the 
Stolen Valor Act, holding that they were unconstitutional under the First Amendment. United 
States v. Lawless, No. 11-173M (D. Md. Aug. 29, 2011). Aaron Lawless, a former member of the 
Marine Corps and Army, was charged with violating the Act after he claimed to have received a 
Silver Star, four Purple Hearts, and two Bronze Stars. Id., slip. op. at 2. After making these 
claims, he received the 2008 Glock Hero Award, given each year by the firearms manufacturer 
to a soldier or law-enforcement officer who demonstrates great courage. Id. 
 190. Dan Frosch, Courts Weigh Efforts To Guard Valor and Speech, N.Y. TIMES AT WAR 
BLOG (May 20, 2011, 1:10 PM), http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/20/courts-weigh-efforts-
to-guard-valor-and-speech. 
 191. United States v. Robbins, 759 F. Supp. 2d 815, 816–17 (W.D. Va. 2011). 
 192. Id. at 816. 
 193. Id. at 822. 
 194. Id. at 815. 
 195. Id. at 819; see also Tushnet, supra note 24, at 5 n.22 (arguing that the Stolen Valor Act 
should be construed to require knowledge of the statement’s falsity). 
 196. Robbins, 759 F. Supp. 2d at 819. 
 197. Id. at 816, 819 (quoting Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2006)). 
 198. See supra notes 79 and accompanying text. 
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has shown some willingness to punish false speech in the context of a 
political campaign,199 the Stolen Valor Act’s restrictions are not 
limited to speech made on the campaign trail, nor to any other 
context. Presumably the restrictions apply wherever speech may 
happen—at a public event in front of an audience, in a public space to 
one person, or even in the privacy of one’s own home. 
B. The Stolen Valor Act Fails Strict Scrutiny 
The Stolen Valor Act is a content-based restriction on speech. It 
singles out a specific statement—that someone has received a military 
honor when he has not—for punishment.200 Although it is unclear 
whether statements such as those punished by the Stolen Valor Act 
are protected, the Court has never indicated that false statements are 
a proscribable category unto themselves,201 and there are strong 
liberty-based and pragmatic reasons for protecting such statements.202 
Thus, false statements of fact should be protected, and the Stolen 
Valor Act should be subject to strict scrutiny. 
To meet the exacting standard of strict scrutiny, the Stolen Valor 
Act must serve a compelling governmental interest and must be 
narrowly tailored to further that interest.203 The Act fails both prongs 
of the test. Protecting the integrity of military honors is not an 
interest that is compelling enough to warrant abridging First 
Amendment freedoms. And even if it were, the Stolen Valor Act is 
not narrowly tailored. It therefore fails strict scrutiny and is 
unconstitutional. 
1. There Is No Compelling Interest.  The government asserted in 
Strandlof that the Stolen Valor Act is intended to protect the 
“sacrifice, history, reputation, honor, and meaning associated with 
military medals and decorations.”204 This goal is certainly noble, as the 
nation depends greatly on the sacrifice of soldiers who earn military 
medals. The Court has previously held, however, that the protection 
 199. See supra notes 94–103 and accompanying text. 
 200. The court noted this fact in Strandlof, stating, “The government does not seriously 
contest that the Stolen Valor Act criminalizes speech on the basis of its content.” United States 
v. Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1188 (D. Colo. 2010). 
 201. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 202. See supra Part II. 
 203. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 204. Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 1189 (quoting Amended Government’s Supplemental 
Brief at 15, Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d 1183 (No. 09-cr-00497-REB)). 
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of symbols is not a compelling interest. There is no cause of action for 
libel on the government, nor is there a cause of action for general 
public frauds, deceptions, or defamations.205 The Alvarez court drew 
from this tenet the statement that “[t]he right against defamation 
belongs to natural persons, not to governmental institutions or 
symbols.”206 Both the Alvarez and Strandlof opinions relied on Texas 
v. Johnson,207 a flag-burning case, to make the same point.208 In 
Johnson, the government argued that banning flag desecration served 
a compelling interest in “preserving the flag as a symbol of 
nationhood and national unity.”209 The Court rejected the argument, 
stating that “[t]o conclude that the government may permit 
designated symbols to be used to communicate only a limited set of 
messages would be to enter territory having no discernible or 
defensible boundaries.”210 The government’s interest in protecting the 
integrity of its military medals, which are symbols of achievement on 
the battlefield, fails to rise to the level of a compelling interest. And 
though lies about military medals may offend or anger veterans and 
others, the First Amendment prohibits punishing speech merely 
because it offends.211 
In addition to protecting the medals themselves, the government 
asserts that the Act serves the compelling interest of promoting 
heroism and sacrifice by military personnel: “[D]iluting the meaning 
 205. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 206. United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1210 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 207. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
 208. Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1210; Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 1189–90. Despite this statement, 
the Alvarez court seemed willing to accept the protection of medals as a compelling interest. See 
Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1216 (“Especially at a time in which our nation is engaged in the longest 
war in its history, Congress has an interest, even a compelling interest, in preserving the 
integrity of its system of honoring our military men and women for their service and, at times, 
their sacrifice.”). 
 209. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 410. 
 210. Id. at 417. The government in Strandlof countered this argument by noting that the 
defendant in Johnson had “intended to convey a particular viewpoint or political opinion.” 
Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 1190. In its opinion, the court dispensed with this distinction by 
determining that Johnson dealt with expressive conduct, as opposed to pure speech, so “a 
determination that the defendant intended to express a particular opinion was a precondition to 
the First Amendment analysis.” Id. The court held that “[n]o such condition precedent applies 
when the restriction impacts pure speech,” and the Stolen Valor Act impacts pure speech. Id. 
 211. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 414 n.13 (1992) (“[T]he First Amendment 
protects offensive speech . . . .”). As noted, Americans are free to deny the Holocaust by making 
statements that are just as verifiably untrue and arguably more offensive and harmful than false 
claims about medals. See Lidsky, supra note 54, at 1093 (“The pernicious effects of Holocaust 
denial stem from its capacity to pollute and corrupt public discourse.”). 
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or significance of medals of honor, by allowing anyone to claim to 
possess such decorations, could impact the motivation of soldiers to 
engage in valorous, and extremely dangerous, behavior on the 
battlefield.”212 As Judge Robert Blackburn noted in Strandlof, and as 
the Ninth Circuit cited approvingly in Alvarez,213 the idea that 
“soldiers may well lose incentive to risk their lives to earn such 
awards”214 is not only unsubstantiated but “unintentionally insulting 
to the profound sacrifices of military personnel the Stolen Valor Act 
purports to honor.”215 The idea that soldiers pause on the battlefield 
to consider whether their actions will result in awards is hard to 
believe. It is more likely that such medals are the byproducts of 
heroic acts in battle, not the goal of such acts. If the medals are 
irrelevant to the behavior of soldiers on the battlefield, there can be 
no compelling interest in promoting heroism through the protection 
of the medals. 
The legislative history of the Act reveals that some legislators 
were also concerned about fraud perpetrated by people falsely 
claiming military medals.216 In his statement introducing the bill on 
the Senate floor, Senator Kent Conrad spoke of “use” of the medals 
to perpetrate crimes217: “These imposters use fake medals—or claim 
to have medals that they have not earned—to gain credibility in their 
communities. These fraudulent acts can often lead to the perpetration 
of very serious crimes.”218 In closing, he expressed the “hope that this 
legislation will serve to honor the courageous heroes who have 
rightfully earned these awards.”219 In doing so, he emphasized fraud 
again: “We must never allow their service and sacrifice to be 
cheapened by those who wish to exploit these honors for personal 
gain.”220 
 212. Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 1190 (quoting Government Response to Amicus Curiae 
Brief of the Rutherford Institute at 11, Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d 1183 (No. 09-cr-00497-REB)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 213. Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1217. 
 214. Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 1190 (quoting Government Response to Amicus Curiae 
Brief of the Rutherford Institute, supra note 212, at 8–9) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 215. Id. 
 216. See 151 CONG. REC. 25,769 (2005) (statement of Sen. Kent Conrad). 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 25,770. 
 220. Id. (emphasis added). Alvarez may have intended for his lie to result in reputational 
benefit, but it ultimately resulted in reputational damage. Lies that are not discovered may 
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Although the interest in disallowing the use of medals for 
fraudulent purposes could be compelling, the statute is simply not 
written as a fraud statute.221 As the Ninth Circuit noted, “Fraud 
statutes must be precisely crafted to target only specific false 
statements that are likely to cause a bona fide harm.”222 Further, laws 
about perjury or fraudulent administrative filings “require at a 
minimum that the misrepresentation be willful, material, and uttered 
under circumstances in which the misrepresentation is designed to 
cause an injury, either to the proper functioning of government . . . or 
to the government’s or a private person’s economic interests.”223 The 
Stolen Valor Act does not require proof of the critical elements of 
“materiality, intent to defraud, and injury.”224 Alvarez may have 
intended for his statement to result in a reputational benefit, but no 
court made a finding that he defrauded anyone.225 Ultimately, because 
the Stolen Valor Act does not fit the fraud framework, the prevention 
of fraud cannot be a compelling interest for the Act. 
2. The Statute Is Not Narrowly Tailored.  Even assuming, as the 
Ninth Circuit did,226 that the government has advanced a compelling 
interest for the Stolen Valor Act, the Act still fails strict scrutiny. A 
law is not narrowly tailored when less speech-restrictive means exist 
to achieve its compelling interest.227 The Stolen Valor Act’s broad 
language fails to provide any limits that would prevent it from also 
prohibiting protected speech. It contains no contextual limitation, no 
result in reputational benefits, but the resulting harm is probably not great enough to warrant 
punishment. 
 221. A bill is pending in the House of Representatives that would amend the Stolen Valor 
Act to require that the misrepresentation be made “with intent to obtain anything of value.” 
Stolen Valor Act of 2011, H.R. 1775, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 222. United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1211 (9th Cir. 2010); see also id. (“[I]n a 
properly tailored fraud action the State bears the full burden of proof. False statement alone 
does not subject a [speaker] to fraud liability. . . . [T]o prove a defendant liable for fraud, the 
complainant must show that the defendant made a false representation of a material fact 
knowing that the representation was false; further, the complainant must demonstrate that the 
defendant made the representation with the intent to mislead the listener, and succeeded in 
doing so.” (alterations and omission in original) (quoting Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. 
Telemarketing Assocs., 538 U.S. 600, 620 (2003))). 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 1212. 
 225. Id. at 1213 (“Alvarez was not prosecuted for impersonating a military officer, or lying 
under oath, or making false statements in order to unlawfully obtain benefits.”). 
 226. See supra note 208. 
 227. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 846 (1997). 
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requirement of intent, and no requirement of concrete, individualized 
harm.228 
It is not hard to imagine contexts in which it would be 
appropriate to punish lies about one’s receipt of military medals. If 
someone used such a claim to receive government benefits, he could 
be prosecuted for fraud under a properly drawn statute.229 The 
government might arguably punish such a statement if it were made 
during a political campaign.230 The Stolen Valor Act, however, does 
not include any such contextual limits, and neither Alvarez nor 
Strandlof was running for office when he made the false statements 
for which he was punished.231 The Act simply punishes any false 
representation of having received a military medal.232 The Ninth 
Circuit recognized the importance of context, noting in Alvarez that 
“[p]erhaps, in context, many of these lies are within the government’s 
legitimate reach.”233 Though Alvarez and Strandlof both made their 
statements in public settings,234 the statute appears to punish such 
statements regardless of where they are made: on the Internet, in a 
bar, or at home. The statute is thus not narrowly drawn to punish only 
false claims that would have a demonstrable negative effect on a valid 
compelling interest. 
As noted by Judge Jones, the statute also fails to require an 
element of intent, an element that is generally necessary in criminal 
statutes.235 As such, it might punish those who are mistaken about 
 228. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 229. See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text. 
 230. See supra Parts I.A.2, I.B. 
 231. See text accompanying note 3. Alvarez apparently had also made such statements 
during his campaign, but the statement for which he was charged was uttered after he had 
already been elected. United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 232. Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2006). 
 233. Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1200. 
 234. Alvarez’s opening brief on appeal argued that “[t]he Court’s scrutiny of the law should 
be especially demanding here, where the statement was made by an elected official, during a 
public meeting, on an issue of public concern: his qualifications for office.” Appellant’s Opening 
Brief at 10, Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198 (No. 08-50345). Strandlof made his claims in many contexts, 
including while he was advocating for antiwar efforts in the run-up to the 2008 presidential 
election. Simpson, supra note 4. 
 235. Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1209; see also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951) 
(“The existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of 
Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.”). But see Tushnet, supra note 24, at 8–9 (arguing that 
legislatures may be able to impose strict liability for some false statements). 
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their award status.236 Even if a requirement of knowledge or intent is 
read into the statute, the statute still identifies no concrete, 
individualized harm that the actor must intend. As the defense noted 
in its opening brief, “Essentially, Congress has created a strict liability 
offense making it a crime to tell a lie about oneself.”237 This concern 
came to the fore in the case of Strandlof, who claimed that 
schizophrenia and bipolar disorder played a role in his behavior.238 
“When I talked with people about my passion about vets’ issues, . . . I 
believed that was the truth,” he said.239 Likewise, during his 
sentencing, the district court suggested that Alvarez’s stories might be 
related to “a psychological problem” or that “alcohol may be one of 
the problems.”240 
When statutes are not narrowly tailored, they run the risk of 
restricting protected speech. As Alvarez’s opening brief argued, the 
statute could apply to innocent bragging, satire, or artistic endeavors 
such as plays and movies, all of which are almost certainly protected 
by the First Amendment.241 Moreover, the brief argued that Alvarez’s 
statements were “plainly incredible and not worthy of actual 
belief,”242 making his punishment a violation of the protection for 
“speakers whose statements cannot reasonably be interpreted as 
allegations of fact.”243 A statute that would punish run-of-the-mill 
exaggeration, artistic portrayals of decorated veterans, or satiric 
writing about war is not narrowly tailored. 
As the Ninth Circuit noted, there are many other ways to protect 
against concrete harm caused by imposters’ claiming medals.244 The 
 236. See Tushnet, supra note 24, at 9–10 (arguing that Senator Mark Kirk may have 
mistakenly “claimed that he personally had won an honor that had actually been awarded to the 
unit in which he was serving”). 
 237. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 234, at 9. The government argued that “[t]he 
Act would not tend to reach the innocent because it prohibits only falsity by a person about 
himself, and it has no tendency to reach any protected speech.” Government’s Answering Brief 
at 14, Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198 (No. 08-50345). 
 238. Simpson, supra note 4. 
 239. Id. (quoting Strandlof) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 240. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 234, at 19 n.5. 
 241. Id. at 18–19. 
 242. Id. at 19. 
 243. Id. (quoting Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1074 (9th Cir. 2005)); see also id. (“By 
protecting [such speakers], courts provide[] assurance that public debate will not suffer for lack 
of imaginative expression or the rhetorical hyperbole which has traditionally added much to the 
discourse of our Nation.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Knievel, 393 F.3d at 1074) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 244. United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1216–17 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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Act could be redrafted to “target actual impersonation or fraud.”245 If 
the government were particularly concerned about protecting the 
integrity of elections, it could draft a statute that would punish lies 
only in that context.246 The government could also simply rely on the 
marketplace for the correction of lies.247 Indeed, both Alvarez’s248 and 
Strandlof’s lies were eventually discovered,249 and both men probably 
experienced much embarrassment and scorn after their lies were 
exposed. The potential for public shaming is enough to keep many 
people from making false claims. Thus, it is hard to find the value in 
punishing Alvarez and Strandlof after their lies have been discovered, 
when they did not use their lies to defraud others—unless one accepts 
the idea that lies about having received medals will have a 
demoralizing effect on troops in battle. Because the Stolen Valor Act 
contains no limitations with regard to context, intent, or harm, it risks 
punishing protected speech and is not sufficiently narrowly tailored to 
pass constitutional muster. 
C. The Stolen Valor Act and Similar Statutes Infringe on Free-Speech 
Values 
The Stolen Valor Act targets speech about oneself, and it 
punishes that speech regardless of its context or whether it results in 
any concrete harm to a third party. In this way, the speech it punishes 
differs from the more narrowly drawn categories of false speech that 
are already subject to restriction. Recognizing this distinction, the 
Ninth Circuit correctly noted that “[t]he Act . . . concerns us because 
of its potential for setting a precedent whereby the government may 
proscribe speech solely because it is a lie.”250 Such a precedent is 
troubling in light of both the liberty and the pragmatic concerns 
discussed in Part II. 
The liberty concerns implicated by the Stolen Valor Act are 
particularly salient. Punishing false statements of fact puts the 
government in the position of determining truth, which could result in 
 245. Id. at 1217. 
 246. See supra notes 102–103 and accompanying text. 
 247. Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1216 (“Here, Alvarez’s lie, deliberate and despicable as it may 
have been, did not escape notice and correction in the marketplace. The preferred First 
Amendment remedy of ‘more speech’ thus was available to repair any harm.” (quoting Brown 
v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 61 (1982))). 
 248. Id. 
 249. Simpson, supra note 4. 
 250. Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1200. 
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undue intrusion into citizens’ private lives. The Ninth Circuit noted 
this concern: “[T]he government’s approach would give it license to 
interfere significantly with our private and public conversations. 
Placing the presumption in favor of regulation . . . would steadily 
undermine the foundations of the First Amendment.”251 Moreover, as 
discussed in Part II, the blurry lines between truth and fiction and fact 
and opinion create the potential for unfair and arbitrary 
punishment.252 A person’s claim to a medal may be ambiguous. There 
is a fine line between saying “I received a Congressional Medal of 
Honor” and alluding more opaquely to a military honor. Because 
differentiating between these statements involves an inherent value 
judgment, the potential for arbitrary and abusive punishment exists. 
Perhaps the strongest theoretical argument against the Stolen 
Valor Act is raised by privacy concerns that implicate the autonomy 
theory of First Amendment protection.253 Even in those instances in 
which the government serves as a recordkeeper, most people would 
not want the government to examine the myriad kinds of personal 
information necessary to fact-check their statements, at least not 
without a compelling reason. Privacy concerns become even more 
problematic when law-enforcement agencies must investigate and 
determine the truth of claims that have no connection to a 
government-granted medal. Take, for instance, Judge Milan Smith, 
Jr.’s example: 
[I]f the Act is constitutional under the analysis proffered by Judge 
Bybee, then there would be no constitutional bar to criminalizing 
lying about one’s height, weight, age, or financial status on 
Match.com or Facebook, or falsely representing to one’s mother 
that one does not smoke, drink alcoholic beverages, is a virgin, or 
has not exceeded the speed limit while driving on the freeway.254 
 251. Id. at 1204. 
 252. See supra Part II.B. 
 253. See supra Part II.A. 
 254. Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1200. Chief Judge Alex Kozinski made a similar point in his 
concurrence in the denial of rehearing en banc: 
If false factual statements are unprotected, then the government can prosecute not 
only the man who tells tall tales of winning the Congressional Medal of Honor, but 
also the JDater who falsely claims he’s Jewish or the dentist who assures you it won’t 
hurt a bit. Phrases such as “I’m working late tonight, hunny,” “I got stuck in traffic” 
and “I didn’t inhale” could all be made into crimes. Without the robust protections of 
the First Amendment, the white lies, exaggerations and deceptions that are an 
integral part of human intercourse would become targets of censorship, subject only 
to the rubber stamp known as “rational basis review.” 
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To determine the truth of such claims, the government would have to 
probe the most private aspects of a person’s life: his sexual history 
and private habits. Few Americans would likely be comfortable with 
the government’s questioning such aspects of their private lives. 
Moreover, it may have been an act of self-fulfillment for 
Strandlof to claim a military medal he had never earned.255 In other 
contexts, it may be the manifestation of a legitimate belief for 
someone to lie about himself. Someone may exaggerate past activities 
to present a better face to the world or may lie to hide past actions 
that he does not feel accurately reflect the person he has become.256 
Such exaggerations and omissions blur the line between truth and lies 
because they implicate perceptions about oneself that may not be 
easily categorized.257 
Finally, the Stolen Valor Act may chill protected speech. This 
danger arises when a speaker is not certain what speech is protected 
and, as a consequence, self-censors expression.258 In other words, if a 
person is scared of being prosecuted for any misstatement or 
exaggeration about himself, he may refrain from speech altogether. 
This result is untenable under the Court’s First Amendment doctrine, 
as it could result in the suppression of highly protected political 
speech.259 
There are also practical reasons to favor a presumption of 
protection for false statements of fact and to strike down laws such as 
United States v. Alvarez, 638 F.3d 666, 673 (9th Cir. 2011) (order denying a petition for panel 
rehearing and rehearing en banc) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring). 
 255. See supra notes 47–52. 
 256. Professor Tushnet uses the example of Don Draper’s backstory in Mad Men (AMC 
television series). Tushnet, supra note 24, at 11 n.49. 
 257. Judge Diarmuid O’Scannlain’s response to Chief Judge Kozinski’s dissent to the denial 
of a rehearing of Alvarez en banc demonstrates the difficulty of line-drawing. He says that some 
of the “lies” Kozinski writes about are not lies at all but “opinions,” “expressions of emotion or 
sensation,” “predictions or plans,” “exaggerations,” and “playful fancy.” Alvarez, 638 F.3d at 
686 (9th Cir. 2011) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting). This recharacterization serves to highlight the 
difficulty with distinguishing truth from falsehood. 
 258. See 1 SMOLLA, supra note 37, § 6:4 (“This overbreadth doctrine is derived in part from 
the elemental proposition that a litigant has always had the right to be judged in accordance 
with a constitutionally valid rule of law. . . . [S]weeping laws . . . tend to deter speakers who do 
have a legitimate right to speak but are afraid that the law would be used against 
them . . . .” (footnote omitted) (quoting Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. 
REV. 1, 3) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 259. The Court generally construes the prohibition against chilling speech broadly. See id. 
(“The overbreadth doctrine . . . is one of those rare constitutional rules in which an admittedly 
‘guilty’ person may be set free . . . because the law is so broad that it might be used against 
another person who had engaged in protected activity.”). 
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the Stolen Valor Act. Criminalizing lies about oneself puts the 
government in the position of policing an enormous number of 
statements. Detection of such statements and subsequent prosecution 
could result in enormous manpower costs.260 Were the protected 
interests compelling, these expenses might be justified. But there is 
little to be gained from prosecuting Alvarez and Strandlof, who have 
already been publicly exposed and shamed. Although they might 
have offended the people who were deceived and veterans who had 
legitimately earned medals, that offense does not rise to the level of 
harm required to make speech punishable.261 Harm to the integrity of 
the medals themselves does not justify the cost of prosecuting and 
imprisoning these men.262 The government is better off relying on the 
marketplace to uncover and correct false statements, as occurred in 
these cases.263 
First Amendment tests are rarely simple or easy to apply, but 
false statements of fact are an area in which the Court could chart a 
simpler course going forward. A rule presumptively protecting false 
statements of fact is much easier to apply than one that allows 
prosecution for such statements, and there is little harm to weigh 
against such a protection. 
CONCLUSION 
The opinions in Alvarez, Strandlof, and Robbins demonstrate the 
varying ways in which federal judges interpret the Supreme Court’s 
opinions on false statements of fact. Although the Court has not 
squarely addressed the question at issue in Alvarez, Strandlof, and 
Robbins, its emphasis on scienter and individualized harm in 
punishing false speech undermines its statement that “there is no 
constitutional value in false statements of fact.”264 Such a statement, 
without more, is an oversimplification that clashes with First 
Amendment values. The Court has never gone so far as to uphold a 
 260. Journalists and fellow citizens could reveal many false claims. For instance, a group of 
veterans runs a site called ReportStolenValor.org, which maintains a database of military 
citations. REPORTSTOLENVALOR.ORG, http://www.reportstolenvalor.org (last visited Oct. 7, 
2011). 
 261. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 262. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 263. See supra notes 247–249 and accompanying text. But see generally Schauer, supra note 
141 (examining the “increasing and unfortunate acceptance of factual falsity in public 
communication” and the failure of the marketplace to correct it). 
 264. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974). 
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statute that punishes false statements of fact simply because they are 
false.265 As such, it is not clear that false statements of fact are 
unprotected and thus subject to a lower standard of scrutiny than 
other statements. 
The Stolen Valor Act may seem like a harmless statute intended 
to protect the honor and integrity of those who have made great 
sacrifices for the United States. Although few would argue that this 
goal is ignoble, it must be considered in light of the fundamental right 
to freedom of speech under the First Amendment. The broad sweep 
of the statute, which punishes lies without regard to context, intent, or 
harm, is dangerous because it presents the potential for a great 
expansion of government control over speech. Such an expansion is 
not justified by a compelling interest, nor is it even necessary given 
that existing laws protect against the most harmful kinds of false 
speech, such as defamation and fraud. 
A rule that presumptively protects false statements of fact, with 
exceptions for those categories of speech that create concrete harm, 
would best protect the values that underlie the First Amendment. It 
would protect against government control of speech and would 
promote privacy and autonomy, and it would allow for ease of 
administration. Moreover, there is little harm to weigh against such 
protection. The Ninth Circuit’s approach is thus the appropriate 
course to follow in considering regulations that seek to punish false 
statements of fact. A presumption that false statements of fact are 
protected, and that regulations are thus subject to strict scrutiny, is in 
line with the central importance of freedom of expression in 
American jurisprudence and society. 
Litigation over the Stolen Valor Act could present an 
opportunity for the Court to clarify its false-speech jurisprudence. 
The split among lower courts reveals confusion in the area of false 
statements of fact that do not fall into the clear categories of 
defamation and fraud. Free-speech jurisprudence would benefit from 
a determination of whether false speech is a category unworthy of 
protection and subject to lower scrutiny, or whether speech is 
presumptively protected without regard to its truth or falsity. Absent 
clarification, this uncertainty presents a great potential for chilling 
protected speech, as well as an undesirable encroachment on 
individual liberty. 
 265. See infra Part I.A.2. 
